10 ideas
8845 | An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor] |
8875 | Sense experiences must have conceptual content, since they are possible reasons for judgements [Brewer,B] |
8842 | The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor] |
8843 | Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor] |
8844 | Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor] |
8846 | Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor] |
8847 | Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor] |
7518 | If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM] |
7520 | Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM] |
7519 | Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM] |